Biometric data is often described as a more secure way to verify identity. A face scan instead of a password. A fingerprint instead of a code. Something you are, rather than something you know.
What is discussed far less often is the permanent cost of integrating biometric data into everyday digital life.
Unlike passwords or tokens, biometric identifiers cannot be changed. Compromised passwords or stolen credit cards can be reset or replaced. If biometric data is leaked or misused, there is no true way to recover. The exposure is permanent.
This distinction matters because biometric systems are increasingly being deployed far beyond high-security environments. Facial scans, voiceprints, and behavioural biometrics are now used to verify age, access platforms, join competitions, or comply with online safety requirements. In some cases, children are being asked to submit this data directly. In others, it is collected indirectly and stored by third parties.
These decisions are commonly rationalized as accurate and convenient. Biometrics seem harder to fake and easier to use. But accuracy is not safety, and convenience does not justify permanent risk.
Collecting biometric data creates a lasting attack surface. Databases can be breached. Vendors can be acquired. Systems can be repurposed. Data collected for one purpose can be used for a more extensive profile. Individuals have little control over these changes.
For young people, the implications are even more serious.
A child cannot grasp the long-term consequences of biometric exposure. They cannot predict how their data may be used in the future. Asking children to join systems that create permanent identifiers means they assume unknown risks for the institution's current needs.
This is not a fair trade.
There is also a social cost. Normalizing biometrics teaches people that bodily data is currency for access. It conditions the next generation to see safety as surveillance and participation as exposure. Once that norm is set, it is hard to undo.
Biometrics have a place. In tightly regulated environments, with strict rules, real need, and real alternatives, they fit. Problems arise when biometrics become the default for issues that do not require them.
Age verification does not require biometric permanence. Online safety does not require lifelong identifiers. Compliance does not require irreversible exposure.
Good systems know some data is too costly to use casually. Biometric data fits this category. Treating it as a convenience rather than a last resort is a mistake we will struggle to undo for years.
If we are serious about protecting people online, especially children, we must go beyond short-term functionality. We must demand systems that minimise permanent data risks, prioritise reversible solutions, and treat biometric data as a last resort. Only by insisting on these standards can we ensure a protected digital future for everyone.